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We analyze optimal contractual arrangements in a bilateral research and development (R&D) partnershipbetween a risk-averse provider that conducts early-stage research followed by a regulatory verification stage
and a risk-neutral client that performs late-stage development activities, including production, distribution, and
marketing. The problem is formulated as a sequential investment game with the client as the principal, where the
investments are observable but not verifiable. The model captures the inherent incentive alignment problems of
double-sided moral hazard, risk aversion, and holdup. We compare the efficacy of milestone-based options
contracts and buyout options contracts from the client’s perspective and identify conditions under which they
attain the first-best outcome for the client. We find that milestone-based options contracts always attain the
first-best outcome for the client when the provider has some bargaining power in renegotiation and identify their
applicability to different R&D partnerships.
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1. Introduction
Firms have traditionally relied on internal research and
development (R&D) to maintain their technological
competitiveness. However, in recent years, firms are
increasingly sourcing new knowledge externally by pur-
suing R&D in a collaborative environment, embedded
in their supply, production, and distribution networks.
According to the Cooperative Agreements and Technol-
ogy Indicators database, in 2006, businesses formed
about 900 new business technology alliances. About
60% of these alliances focused on biotechnology, fol-
lowed by information technology, chemicals, aerospace,
and automotive sectors. In the 1980s most of these
were equity alliances, but today 96% of these R&D
alliances are nonequity alliances based on contracts.
In 2008, Eli Lilly decided to move away from its
traditional vertically integrated in-house R&D model
to a more “fully integrated pharmaceutical network”
that focuses on R&D relationships with partners with
complementary assets (Deloitte 2009). Similarly, Merck
formed an R&D partnership with Nicholas Piramal
for the discovery and development of new oncology
drugs (Nicholas Piramal 2007). In the chemicals sector,
DuPont recently formed an R&D partnership with
Plantic Technologies Limited (DuPont 2007). Plantic
will develop biopolymers based on renewably sourced
resins and sheet materials based on high-amylose corn
starch, and DuPont will market and distribute these
products.
Despite this rapid growth in R&D partnerships (e.g.,
Hagedoorn and Roijakkers 2006, Miller 2007), firms
struggle to effectively manage these partnerships: More
than 30% of the governing contracts get renegotiated
or terminated by mutual consent, and many of them
are settled in court (Sahoo 2008). In 1994, Ligand Phar-
maceuticals, a biotech firm, sued Pfizer for breach of
contract over the research they performed for Pfizer
on the compound droloxifene; this case was settled
out of court in 1996 (PR Newswire 1996). Other recent
examples of R&D partnerships that ended in legal
proceedings because of contractual issues are Amylin
Pharmaceuticals against Eli Lilly on their diabetes col-
laboration (Krishnan 2011) and Onyx Pharmaceuticals
against Bayer on their development agreement for
cancer drugs (Jones 2009).
The decentralized nature of R&D partnerships can
create several agency issues that pose significant chal-
lenges to its effectiveness. This paper investigates
contractual structures that can overcome some of the
agency issues prevalent in such partnerships. Specifi-
cally, we focus on three agency issues motivated by
our observations of R&D collaborations across different
settings. First, bilateral investments in the R&D process
are observable to both parties but not verifiable in a
963
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court of law and hence are not directly contractible,
creating a double-sided moral hazard problem. In the
pharmaceutical industry, for example, a report by the
U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment (1993)
notes that pharmaceutical companies have actively
resisted providing R&D cost data to congressional
agencies. In the past, an attempt by the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) to obtain data on pharma-
ceutical R&D costs was foiled after many years of
effort that involved decisions in the U.S. Supreme
Court. The inherent differences in the structure of cost-
accounting systems across companies can introduce
potential inconsistencies and biases that are difficult to
resolve via the legal process. In other words, nonverifi-
ability of investments in R&D is an important feature
of this process, leading to double-sided moral hazard.
This, in turn, may lead to suboptimal investments,
inducing inefficiencies in these R&D partnerships.
Second, the relationship-specific investments are
made more complex by the agency structure and
sequence of decision making in the R&D process.
Contractual inefficiencies are introduced by the classical
holdup problem, where the principal may exercise its
bargaining power once the agent’s relationship-specific
investments are sunk to increase its profits, thereby
creating incentives for the agent to underinvest (Gilbert
and Cvsa 2003, Erat 2006, Edlin and Hermalin 2000).
Third, the contract design problem is further com-
plicated because small and specialized research orga-
nizations (henceforth referred to as providers) with
owner managers are risk averse compared with pub-
licly owned large firms who contract out parts of their
research portfolios (henceforth referred to as clients)
and who have significant resources and easy access
to liquid capital markets (Eisenhardt 1989). In the
pharmaceutical industry, big pharmaceutical firms (the
clients) have well-diversified R&D portfolios compared
with the biotech firms (the providers). Thus, the design
of optimal contracts in the presence of such agency
issues (double-sided moral hazard, holdup, and risk
aversion) becomes critical for the effective governance
of these R&D partnerships.
The economics literature has proposed contracts to
resolve these tensions in coordinating bilateral part-
nerships in a sequential investment setting (Edlin
and Hermalin 2000 and references therein). However,
the primary focus of this literature has been on the
option of transferring ownership (buyout options) of
the underlying asset. For example, Edlin and Hermalin
(2000) find that buyout options can attain the first-best
outcome for the client (the first-best outcome is defined
as the outcome in which both firms in the partnership
make their first-best or optimal investments as in the
coordinated setting, and the client attains its maximum
profits) in a limited range of settings.
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether con-
tracts other than buyout options can be designed so
that the first-best outcome is attained for the client in a
wider range of settings. To study alternative contracts,
our setup includes an important practice-driven fea-
ture of R&D partnerships. In particular, in the R&D
context, the investment made by the provider in the
research stage (typically a biotech or contract research
organization firm in the first stage) is followed by an
intermediate verifiable signal provided by a regulatory
authority (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration);
subsequently, the client (pharmaceutical firm) makes an
investment in the development stage on marketing and
manufacturing activities in the next stage. In contrast,
the economics literature cited above does not consider
the context of bilateral partnerships and such process
specific elements in its models.
In this paper, we ask the following questions: Does
the inclusion of process specificities of R&D (regulatory
approval) result in new levers (milestone payments)
that can coordinate the efforts of the two firms to
attain the first-best outcome for the client?1 Is the range
of settings in which contracts that include milestone
payments attain the first-best outcome larger than
the cases where buyout options contracts attain the
first-best outcome?
To answer these questions, we formulate a very
general model of joint R&D efforts as a sequential
investment game with double-sided moral hazard.
As stated above, the risk-averse provider performs the
initial research stage activities, and the client performs
the development, integration, and manufacturing activ-
ities. We assume that the investments made by the two
firms are observable but not verifiable (see Nöldeke
and Schmidt 1998). In addition, if the provider owns
the outcome of the R&D partnership such as intel-
lectual property (IP) rights, then the provider has
an option to sell the outcome to a third party for a
prespecified value.
Before we present the formal mathematical model
and our corresponding results, in the following para-
graph, we illustrate the R&D setting with an example
of a neurological drug being codeveloped between
Supernus Pharmaceuticals and Shire plc Supernus
is a specialty pharmaceutical company focused on
developing and commercializing products for the treat-
ment of central nervous system diseases. Supernus
does not own or operate manufacturing facilities for
the production of any of its potential products, nor
does it have plans to develop its own manufacturing
1 Such milestone-based payments from the client to the provider
that are contingent on approval by the regulatory authority are
used widely in practice. For example, in the partnership between
Merck and Nicholas Piramal, the latter is eligible to receive milestone
payments of up to $175 million per target, plus royalties on sales
resulting from this collaboration.
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operations for these products in the foreseeable future.
Hence, for revenues, it relies on fees for development
services and payment for the achievement of specified
development and regulatory and sales milestones and
royalties of its drugs under development (Supernus
2012). Supernus developed the drug Intuniv in 2006,
which is an extended-release formulation of guanfacine
and is used in the treatment of ADHD, in collaboration
with Shire plc. The contract between the two involved
a combination of fixed fees, milestone payments, and
royalties. However, this contract was renegotiated later,
and ex ante this potential for later renegotiation could
give rise to holdup on the part of the client, Shire plc.
In May 2009, in exchange for a one-time, lump sum pay-
ment of $36.9 million, Shire renegotiated the terms of
its contract with Supernus, and Supernus sold its rights
for Intuniv to an affiliate of Shire plc on a royalty-free,
fully paid-up basis (Supernus 2012). Following this, on
September 2, 2009, Shire obtained FDA approval for the
manufacturing and marketing of Intuniv to children
age 6 to 17 in the United States (Shire 2009, Havrilla
2012). Although our focus is on the pharmaceutical
industry, the existence of intermediate verifiable signals
in bilateral investment environments in R&D is valid
in other industries as well. For example, in the aviation
industry, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pro-
vides regulatory approval for the design of propeller
systems, engines, and auxiliary power units for aircraft
(FAA 2009). This further underscores the importance of
incorporating the context specific elements (milestone
payments linked to regulatory approval) of the R&D
process in designing contracts.
To summarize, our paper models three relevant
agency issues motivated by practice and literature on
R&D partnerships. An important contribution of our
paper is that by taking into account characteristics of
R&D processes such as intermediate verifiable out-
comes, we can analyze the attainment of the first-best
outcome by simultaneously resolving double-sided
moral hazard, holdup, and risk aversion. Thus, the
contract structures developed in this paper provide
normative guidelines for the optimal design of coordi-
nating contracts to resolve the agency issues in R&D
partnerships.
2. Literature Review
The operations literature on contracting has investi-
gated the design of optimal contracts to coordinate
investments and resolve agency problems. Plambeck
and Taylor (2007) consider bilateral investments where
the firm invests in innovation and the supplier invests
in capacity. However, since supply quantity is verifiable
in their model, a quantity enforcing mechanism can
ensure the first-best outcome in the one-buyer, one-
supplier case. Related papers by Taylor and Plambeck
(2007a, b) are based on unilateral investments in single-
and multiperiod games and hence very different from
our model. Similarly, Gilbert and Cvsa (2003) consider a
manufacturer-supplier relationship, where the supplier
invests in innovation, but the manufacturer makes
pricing decisions that introduce moral hazard in the
supplier’s investment decision. They study the trade-off
between price commitment strategies that mitigate
holdup but also reduce the flexibility to respond to
demand fluctuations. Our setting is different from the
aforementioned papers because we study the efficacy
of options contracts in the context of double-sided
moral hazard, holdup and risk aversion.
In the healthcare R&D field, Crama et al. (2008) and
Iyer et al. (2005) study the optimal contract design prob-
lem within the principal–agent framework. Crama et al.
(2008) model the biotech firm as the principal with an
information asymmetry on technical characteristics of
the drug. The actions of the agent are not contractible,
creating a problem of adverse selection and single-sided
moral hazard. Iyer et al. (2005) study the bilateral prob-
lem where the buyer makes resource commitments to
a supplier who in turn decides on its optimal allocated
resources with adverse selection about the capability of
the supplier. Xiao and Xu (2012) study the effect of roy-
alty revisions in a contract between an innovator and
marketer and find that royalty revisions have a tradeoff
owing to the better incentive realignment property and
the potential for holdup. They identify that royalty
contracts contingent on the outcome of the initial R&D
stage can manage this trade-off better. We contribute to
this stream of research by studying milestone-based
(like Xiao and Xu 2012, milestone-based payments are
contingent on the R&D outcome) options contracts and
identifying their efficacy for optimal contract design.
Our paper is different from Xiao and Xu (2012) because
our focus is to study options-based contracts. Although
the options contracts proposed in this paper are not
renegotiation proof, we show that no renegotiation
is needed in equilibrium. More importantly, unlike
Xiao and Xu (2012), our paper shows the efficacy
of milestone-based options contracts in attaining the
first-best outcome for the client.
In the context of collaborative new product devel-
opment, Bhaskaran and Krishnan (2009) assume that
the efforts, costs, and revenues are verifiable and find
that in the absence of preexisting revenues, cost- and
effort-sharing contracts lead to better results. Our paper
is different because investments made by parties are not
verifiable, which in turn create agency issues. In a new
product codevelopment setting, Erat (2006) analyzes
the impact of market and development uncertainty
on the timing of contract negotiation and shows that
contracts should be signed only after uncertainty is
partially resolved. We complement this research by
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studying the affiliated agency issues of double moral
hazard, holdup, and risk aversion.
The contract design problem has also been studied in
the coproduction framework (Roels et al. 2010, Corbett
et al. 2005). However, in the coproduction setting,
the two players move simultaneously; these papers
show that the first-best solution cannot be achieved in
general, and they characterize static revenue-sharing
and cost-sharing contracts that are optimal but second
best. Roels et al. (2010) also show that if efforts of the
players can be verified for a cost, the first-best solu-
tion can be achieved. However, the parties make less
than their first-best profits since the monitoring cost
introduces an inefficiency into the system. In a related
vein, Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) also show
that a two-part contract with a variable outcome-based
payment and fixed fee is the optimal but second-
best solution to the joint production problem with
double-sided moral hazard. In a outsourced customer
support context, Bhattacharya et al. (2014) study the
use of gain-share and cost-plus contracts in incen-
tivizing the support center to participate effectively
in the client’s product improvement initiative. In con-
trast, R&D partnerships frequently have a sequential
investment setting, as the second-stage investments are
made after regulatory verification is obtained; there-
fore, milestone-based options contracts can be used in
this setting.
In the economics literature, studies that characterize
the use of options-based contracts in the sequential
bilateral investment environment with nonverifiable
investments and studies that consider incomplete con-
tracts are relevant to our setting (Nöldeke and Schmidt
1998, Edlin and Hermalin 2000, Demski and Sapping-
ton 1991, Lulfesmann 2004, Grossman and Hart 1986).
However, none of these studies models the specificity
of the R&D process, in particular, intermediate verifi-
able outcomes, that are commonly observed in practice.
In our paper, we show that modeling these process
specificities leads us to novel insights that cannot be
inferred from previous studies. We show that options-
based contracts that are driven by milestone payments
contingent on the outcome of the regulatory verifi-
cation stage attain the first-best outcome in all cases
if the provider has some bargaining power; if the
provider does not have bargaining power, then we
characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the first-best solution to be obtained. In contrast,
buyout options-based contracts studied in the literature
attain the first-best outcome only if the provider has
all the bargaining power or the marginal value of the
outside option of the provider is higher than a certain
threshold (Edlin and Hermalin 2000).
The main differences between our paper and the
economics literature are as follows. Nöldeke and
Schmidt (1998) and Lulfesmann (2004) study the bilat-
eral investment game with buyout options contracts
where both parties are risk neutral and show that
late exercise dates help to obtain the first-best solu-
tion. In contrast, in this paper, the provider is risk
averse; hence, the contract structures in Nöldeke and
Schmidt (1998) and Lulfesmann (2004) do not obtain
the first-best solution. Edlin and Hermalin (2000) show
that buyout options contracts can attain the first-best
solution if the provider has an outside option to sell
the outcome of its activities and marginal value of this
option is higher than a certain threshold. In contrast,
the milestone-based options contracts proposed in this
paper are able to obtain the first-best solution in a
wider variety of cases. Our paper (i) highlights the
importance of incorporating intermediate verifiable
outcomes while studying the design of optimal con-
tracts in R&D partnerships and (ii) demonstrates the
role of milestone payments, which are prevalent in
multiple context in alleviating agency issues.
3. Model Description
In this section, we describe the model setting and state
our assumptions. Based on the illustrative example
of Supernus above, we model the contract design
problem for coordinating bilateral investments in an
R&D partnership by assuming that the provider (agent)
is the first mover who invests in the research stage, and
the client (principal) is the second mover who invests
in the development stage. The investments made by
both parties are observable as the parties collaborate
closely but are not verifiable and the agent is assumed
to be risk averse (prefers deterministic outcomes to
stochastic outcomes). The sequence of events in our
setting is summarized in Figure 1.
At time t = 0, the client (principal) offers a contract
to the provider (agent). The agent accepts the contract
provided that it ensures that the agent’s expected utility
is greater than its reservation value, which is normal-
ized to zero. As shown in Figure 1, the provider then
makes an investment of x ∈R+ in the research stage at
time t = 1, and the outcome of the research stage is
realized at time t = 2. The probability of a successful
outcome is dependent on the investment made by the
provider and is given by g4x5. The outcome of the
research stage is given by either regulatory approval or
rejection; in the pharmaceutical industry, FDA approval
represents the regulatory verification stage. Other exam-
ples of regulatory approval include Environmental
Protection Agency approval in the chemicals and oil
and gas industries, and FAA approval for the design of
propeller systems, engines, and auxiliary power units
for aircraft (FAA 2009).
If the outcome is successful, then at time t = 3, the
client makes an investment of y ∈R+ in the develop-
ment stage. The final reward  from introducing the
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Figure 1 Timeline and Sequence of Events in the Model
Client offers
contract to
provider
Research
stage
(investment
by provider)
Potential
renegotiation
followed by
option
exercise by
client
Regulatory
verification
stage
Development
stage
(investment
by client)
Final
outcome
Time t = 0 t = 1 t ∈(1, 2) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
new product on the market (net profits and IP rights)
accrues at time t = 4. We assume that  has support
in the interval ê and has a probability distribution
function of f 4  x1y5 and a cumulative distribution
function of F 4  x1y5= ∫ 0 f 4  x1y5d. We make the
following assumptions about the model parameters
(similar to those in Edlin and Hermalin 2000).
Assumption 1. The probability of a successful out-
come (g4x5) is concave and increasing in x ∈ 6015, with
g405= 0, and g′45= 0. This implies that the marginal
rewards for the provider will be diminishing in the scale
of the investment. This is a standard assumption in the
literature on probability success functions in R&D (Derman
et al. 1975).
Assumption 2. For the final reward ,  = 0 with
probability 1 if y = 0 ∀x ∈ 6017. This implies that the
impact of the provider’s investment alone is not enough to
gain a reward from the partnership, or for the product to be
launched, and that some minimal investment must be made
by the client firm as well. Also, E6  x1y7 is increasing in
x and y.
Assumption 3. The investments x and y are observable
but not verifiable; hence, they are not directly contractible.
The outcome of the provider’s research stage investment is
binary (success or failure), observable, and verifiable and
hence is contractible.
Assumption 4. If the provider owns the revenues and
IP rights from the new product, as in the buyout options
contract, then it has an option to sell the rights to the
revenues and IP to a third party (the value accrued is
henceforth referred to as the outside option value M4x5≥ 0).
The option value M4x5 is a function of the investment of
the provider x that is observable to the third party. The
option value M4x5 may be stochastic or deterministic. If x is
not observable to the third party, then our results can be
replicated by assuming M4x5= M˜ .
Assumption 5. We assume that all parameters and
functions are such that the first-best investments, x∗ and y∗,
are interior points.
Assumption 6. We assume that at any decision epoch,
if an agent is indifferent between two decisions (e.g.,
accept/reject the renegotiation offer, exercise one of two
options), then that agent will take the decision that maxi-
mizes the joint profits. This is a standard assumption and
can be ensured without loss of generality by rewarding an
arbitrarily small payment,  > 0, to the agent for making
such a decision (see Laffont and Martimort 2001, p. 37).
Assumption 7. After the provider has sunk its invest-
ment, any renegotiation by the client and the provider is
conducted as follows: the renegotiation bargaining outcome
is given by the GNB model, where the bargaining power
during renegotiation of the provider is given by , and the
bargaining power of the client is given by 1 −.
Assumption 8. We assume that the provider is risk
averse and has a utility of U4z5, defined on the real line,
from a payoff of z. We also assume U ′4z5 > 0, U ′′4z5 < 0,
and U405= 0. The increasing concave assumption about
the utility function of the provider is standard in the
literature. We also assume that the net surplus from an
action x is separable in the revenue and the effort (Edlin
and Hermalin 2000, Hermalin and Katz 1991). In the
pharmaceutical industry, biotech firms are small, have less
diverse portfolios compared with pharmaceutical firms, and
discount potential future risky payments to a larger extent
(> 20%) compared with pharmaceutical firms (8%–12%),
the evidence supports their being risk averse with concave
utility functions (Eisenhardt 1989, Kawasaki and Macmillan
1987, Villiger and Bogdan 2005, Swinney et al. 2011).
Assumption 9. We assume that contract parameters
(milestone payments, fixed fees) are unrestricted decision
variables that are chosen by the client to maximize its
expected profit subject to the individual rationality and
incentive compatibility constraints. We discuss the practical
implications of this assumption in §4.2.
4. Model Analysis
In this section, we study the efficacy of milestone-
based options contracts. To analyze the performance of
milestone-based options contracts, we compare their
ability to attain the first-best outcome with that of
buyout options contracts that have been previously
studied in the literature. We begin by defining the
first-best outcome. The first-best outcome is defined by
an outcome that maximizes the client’s profit, subject
to the provider’s expected utility being its reserva-
tion value (normalized to zero). In addition, such an
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outcome should not require paying the provider any
risk premium. Because the investments in the research
and development stages are made sequentially, we
first define y∗4x5 as the optimal investment in the
development stage, given an investment level x during
the research stage. Therefore, we have
y∗4x5= arg max
y≥0
{
E6  x1y7− y}0 (1)
Here E6  x1y7 = ∫
ê
dF 4  x1y5. Let V 4x5 be the
optimal value of the outcome after the research stage,
if the outcome of the research stage is successful.
That is, V 4x5= E6  x1y∗4x57−y∗4x5. Similar to Edlin
and Hermalin (2000), the following problem defines
the first-best outcome for the client:
max
T 1x∈6015
{
V 4x5g4x5− T }
s.t. U4T 5− x= 00
Since x∗ is assumed to be an interior point, we have
the following first-order condition:
dV 4x5g4x5
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=x∗
= 1
U ′4U−14x∗55
0 (2)
Equations (1) and (2) determine the first-best invest-
ments 8x∗1 y∗4x∗59. To summarize, for the client to attain
the first-best outcome, a contract should ensure that
the provider and the client make investments equal
to x∗ and y∗4x∗5, respectively, and the net transfer
payment from the client to the provider is U−14x∗5.
Note that for the provider’s participation constraint
to be satisfied while no risk premium is paid to the
provider, it implies (from Jensen’s inequality) that
the provider’s realized compensation is not linked to
uncertain elements in the system. Also note that if
the contract terms only contain fixed fees, then the
provider has no incentive to exert a positive invest-
ment. Therefore, any contract form that attains the
first-best outcome must have some contingent elements
in the form of options (or renegotiation) with fixed fees
(deterministic) as one option and performance-linked
(stochastic) compensation as another.
The extant literature has shown the role of one type of
options contracts, namely, buyout options contracts, in
attaining the first-best outcome for the client. However,
as noted in that literature, buyout options contracts
have a limited ability of attaining the first-best outcome.
In the absence of guidelines from the existing literature,
it is unclear if any other type of options contracts can
attain the first-best outcome. Our analysis below shows
that exploiting the specificity of R&D processes, namely,
regulatory approval, allows the client to create options
contracts that are linked to milestone-based terms, and
such contracts are able to attain the first-best outcome
for a wider range of conditions.
4.1. Milestone-Based Options Contracts
In this section, we analyze the case where milestone-
based options contracts are offered by the client to the
provider. Milestone-based options contracts are very
widely used in practice in R&D partnerships in general
and in the healthcare industry in particular (Crama
et al. 2008, Robinson and Stuart 2007). We focus on
pure milestone-based options contracts that consist
of milestone payments and a fixed fee.2 Let the client
offer the provider an options-based contract to be
exercised at time t ∈ 41125 such that the client could
either pay the provider a milestone payment TM if
the intermediate verifiable signal is successful with a
fixed fee TA (option A) or it could pay the provider a
fixed fee TB (option B). The exercise date of such an
options contract is observed in the Intuniv illustrative
example, where the milestone and royalty payments
were replaced with a fixed fee before FDA approval.
The utilities of the provider from such an options
contract are given by Edlin and Hermalin (2000):
UAP =U4TM + TA5g4x5+U4TA541 − g4x55− x1
U BP =U4TB5− x0
Since the provider moves first, it is exposed to a
potential holdup by the client, wherein the client
may renegotiate the terms of the contract. A potential
holdup may take place in this case if the client does
not exercise option B—which exposes the risk-averse
provider to a stochastic milestone payment, in which
case both the provider and the client are mutually
better off by renegotiating option A to a fixed-fee
contract T˜A at time t ∈ 41125. The total surplus of such
a renegotiation is
G4x5 = [V 4x5g4x5− T˜A+ T˜A−x]
−[4V 4x5−TM 5g4x5−TA
+U−1(U4TM +TA5g4x5+U4TA541−g4x55)−x]
= TMg4x5+TA
−U−1(U4TM +TA5g4x5+U4TA541−g4x55)0 (3)
Here, the first term on the right-hand side of the
above equation 46V 4x5g4x5− T˜A + T˜A −x75 is the joint
expected profit after renegotiation, and the second term
464V 4x5−TM 5g4x5−TA +U−14U 4TM +TA5g4x5+U4TA5 ·
41 −g4x555− x75 is the joint expected profit before rene-
gotiation. Let U¯ 4x5=U4TM +TA5g4x5+U4TA541 − g4x55.
Note that U−14U¯ 4x55 is the certainty equivalent of the
uncertain total payment of the provider under option A.
It is straightforward to check that G4x5≥ 0 because
U4TMg4x5+ TA5 ≥ U4TM + TA5g4x5 + U4TA541 − g4x55
2 Milestone-based options contracts may also include royalty terms.
Our analysis and results are robust to such cases.
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from Jensen’s inequality. The surplus of renegotiation
G4x5 has an intuitive interpretation: it is the risk pre-
mium for the provider; that is, G4x5 is the amount
that a risk-averse provider is willing to pay to con-
vert its stochastic payment to a deterministic amount.
The gains from such renegotiation may be split between
the provider and the client based on their relative bar-
gaining power during the renegotiation stage. As stated
in Assumption 7, since the bargaining power of the
provider is given by , the provider will get G4x5
from the generalized Nash bargaining (GNB) result,
which is a property of the GNB model. The GNB model
has been used extensively in the literature (Lovejoy
2010, Iyer and Villas-Boas 2003). Hence, if the client
does not exercise option B, then option A will be
renegotiated to a fixed-fee contract (T˜A) such that T˜A =
U−14U¯ 4x55+G4x5. Such a renegotiation is observed in
the Intuniv illustrative example, where the payment
components linked to stochastic outcomes were renego-
tiated to a fixed fee. Therefore, because of the holdup
problem, which leads to renegotiation, the client will
choose to transfer a payment equal to min8T˜A1TB9 to
the provider. Hence, the provider’s problem can be
stated as
max
x≥0
min
{
U4U−14U¯ 4x55+G4x55− x1U4TB5− x
}
0
(4)
The client’s problem can be stated as
max
TM 1TA1TB
6E6  x˜1 y˜4x˜57− y˜4x˜57g4x˜5
− min8U−14U¯ 4x˜55+G4x˜51 TB9 (5)
s.t.
y˜4x5 = argmax
y≥0
6E6 x1y7−y7g4x5
−min{U−14U¯ 4x55+G4x51TB}1 (6)
x˜ = argmaxmin
x≥0
{
U4U−14U¯ 4x55+G4x55−x1
U4TB5−x
}
1 (7)
min
{
U4U−14U¯ 4x˜55+G4x˜55− x˜1U 4TB5− x˜
}≥00 (8)
The client’s problem is characterized by (5) at t = 0
and by (6) at t = 3. The provider firm solves (7) at
t = 1, and (8) is the provider’s participation constraint.
We examine whether such a milestone-based options
contract can attain the first-best solution, and we state
the result formally in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. A milestone-based options contract that
gives the client the right at time t ∈ 41125 to choose between
options A and B can attain the first-best solution for the
client if and only if there exists a TM1TA such that ∀x ∈
601x∗5:
U
(
4TMg4x5+ TA5+ 41 −5U−14U¯ 4x55
)− x
≤U (4TMg4x∗5+ TA5+ 41 −5U−14U¯ 4x∗55)− x∗ = 00
Here options A and B are the following:
Option A. Pay the provider a fixed payment TA and a
milestone payment TM if the intermediate verifiable signal is
successful.
Option B. Pay the provider a fixed payment TB.
The compensation to the provider under the
milestone-based options contract after renegotiation is
shown in Figure 2. (All the numerical values used for
the parameters are stated in the appendix.) The mechan-
ics of the options contract based on milestone payments
are as follows. The client sets the terms of the contract
such that if the provider invests lower than x∗, then
the client will exercise option A (Figure 3). In this case,
the condition in Proposition 1 states that the provider
will not earn its reservation utility and hence stands
to gain by investing x∗. If the provider invests more
than x∗, then TB is set in such a manner that the client
will exercise option B, which will also result in a lower
utility for the provider. Hence, the provider invests x∗
as illustrated in Figure 2. The necessary and sufficient
condition stated in Proposition 1 gives the client the
range of contractual parameters such that the provider
makes an investment of x∗ and gets its reservation
value. After the provider’s investment, all the upside
from the partnership is with the client (because it pays
only a fixed fee); hence, the client makes its optimal
investment, y∗. Therefore, this options contract resolves
the holdup and risk aversion issues simultaneously.
An important detail of such an options contract is
that although its mechanics require both players to
anticipate the potential renegotiation due to holdup
when choosing their actions prior to the potential
renegotiation (8TM1TA1TB9 for the client and x for the
provider are actions prior to the potential renegotia-
tion), no renegotiation will take place in equilibrium
because both players know that renegotiation will yield
an outcome equivalent to option B.
Figure 2 Utility of Provider Under Milestone-Based Options Contract
After Renegotiation with = 005
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Figure 3 Client’s Expected Profit (with Endogenous Optimal Client
Effort) as a Function of Provider’s Effort
2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0
× 106
–1.0
–0.5
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
× 107
Expected profit of client
under option B
Expected profit of client under option A
Provider’s effort, x x = x*
A key observation in such contracts is the important
role played by the milestone payments (option A).
The milestone payment in this contract drives the
investment of the provider to the first-best investment
and gives the incentive to the provider to increase its
investment under option A to be equal to its first-best
investment, whereas the fixed fee is used to make
the participation constraint of the provider tight. This
finding has important implications for the use of mile-
stone payments in the design of optimal contracts.
In the operations literature, milestones have been
recognized for their role in monitoring and coordi-
nating the product and supply chain development
investment (Joglekar et al. 2001, Graves and Willems
2005, Mihm 2010, Crama et al. 2008), and they are
observed widely in practice as well (Robinson and
Stuart 2007). We complement this stream of literature
by demonstrating the criticality of milestone payments
in options-based contracts to coordinate bilateral invest-
ments in R&D partnerships to overcome agency issues
such as double-sided moral hazard, holdup, and risk
aversion simultaneously.
The following conditions are sufficient to satisfy the
condition in Proposition 1 and hence enable milestone-
based options contracts to attain the first-best outcome:
∃TM1TA s.t. U ′
(
U−14U¯ 4x55+G4x5)
· d6U
−14U¯ 4x55+G4x57
dx
≥11
∀x∈ 601x∗71 (9)
U
(
4TMg4x
∗5+TA5+41−5U−14U¯ 4x∗55
)−x∗ =00 (10)
Equation (10) gives the client the value of the fixed
fee TA to attain the first-best solution and is depen-
dent on TM . Hence, milestone-based options contracts
can attain the first-best solution if Equation (9) is
satisfied. Because U4 · 5 is an increasing function, Equa-
tion (9) is always satisfied if there exists a TM such that
d6U−14U¯ 4x55+G4x57/dx can be made sufficiently large.
Proposition 2 describes the domain of conditions under
which milestone-based options contracts always attain
the first-best solution.
Proposition 2. Milestone-based options contracts can
always attain the first-best solution if  ∈ 40117.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that milestone-based
options contracts always attain the first-best outcome
if the provider has some bargaining power during
renegotiation.3 This is an important result because it
shows that irrespective of other parameters like the
reward and degree of risk aversion, the client can
attain the first-best outcome when the provider has
some bargaining power in renegotiation because the
holdup problem is alleviated. Hence, although first-
order intuition may suggest that if the client has all
the bargaining power in renegotiation, the client may
perform better, Proposition 2 shows that having all
the bargaining power in renegotiation may hinder the
client’s ability to attain the first-best outcome.
The milestone-based options contracts are able to
attain the first-best outcome if > 0 because the regu-
latory approval depends on the efforts of the provider,
and hence, the milestone-based options contract is able
to alleviate the holdup problem. The attainment of
the first-best outcome also requires that the provider
does not earn any risk premium which is ensured
by the fixed-fee option embedded in the contracts
proposed above. In a single-sided moral hazard setting
with a risk-averse agent, Hermalin and Katz (1991)
show that the first-best outcome may be attained via a
renegotiation mechanism. (Edlin and Hermalin 2001
provide a correction for a proof presented in Hermalin
and Katz 1991.) Our results are different from this
literature because the contracts presented above do not
require renegotiation in equilibrium to attain the first-
best outcome. More importantly, the milestone-based
options contract is more robust in attaining the first-best
outcome, in that any renegotiation-based mechanism
can be replicated by an options contract by setting
one option equal to the initial contract and another
option equal to the renegotiated contract. However,
the other way round is not always true. For example,
the condition used in Edlin and Hermalin (2001) to
show the attainment of the first-best outcome using a
renegotiation mechanism in our context would imply
that g4x5 < g4x∗5 ∀x 6= x∗. This implies that g4x5 < g4x∗5
∀x > x∗, which violates the context specificity of our
model wherein the probability of a successful outcome
3 The condition on the bargaining power of the provider  ensures
that the sufficient conditions for the attainment of the first-best
outcome are satisfied and hence is a conservative condition.
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from the regulatory approval stage is increasing in x
∀x ∈ 6015. Thus, the milestone-based options contract
presented in this paper provides normative guidelines
for the optimal design of coordinating contracts to
resolve the agency issues in R&D partnerships.
Proposition 3. If = 0, then milestone-based options
contracts may or may not attain the first-best solution.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for milestone-based
options contracts to attain the first-best solution when = 0
are given by there exists a finite TH1 TL such that U4TH 5≥
x∗ + 41 − g4x∗55/g′4x∗5 and U4TL5≤ x∗ − g4x∗5/g′4x∗5.
Proposition 3 shows that if the provider does not
have any bargaining power, the client can only attain
the first-best solution if the stated conditions in the
proposition are satisfied. This result shows that the
client cannot always attain the first-best solution if
it has all the bargaining power during renegotiation.
The driver of this result is the ability of the client to
incentivize the provider to make its first-best invest-
ment: if the provider does not have some bargaining
power during renegotiation, the client is not able to
give it sufficient incentives to overcome the holdup
problem because the risk-averse provider may heavily
discount the stochastic milestone payments. However,
when the provider has some bargaining power during
renegotiation (> 0), it is partly compensated by the
certainty equivalent of the original option A and partly
by the gains of the renegotiation. In this case it is
possible to set a milestone payment, even if highly
discounted by the provider, such that the total transfer
payment to the provider (from the discounted certainty
equivalent of option A and the shared gains from
renegotiation) is large enough to overcome the holdup
problem (making options A and B equivalent).
We now analyze the efficacy of buyout options
contracts in attaining the first-best solution.
4.1.1. Comparison with Buyout Options Contracts.
We now compare the efficacy of milestone-based
options contracts in attaining the first-best solution with
that of buyout options contracts, which have been the
main contracts that have been studied in ameliorating
the effect of the holdup issue in double moral hazard
applications in the literature (Edlin and Hermalin 2000).
Buyout options contracts are structured as follows.
The client offers the provider an options-based contract
to be exercised at time t ∈ 41125 such that the client
could either own the entire value of the IP from the
research stage and pay the provider a fixed fee T2
(option 2) or give the provider the entire value of the IP
and a fixed fee T1 (option 1). If the client uses option 1,
the provider has the ownership of the IP after the
research stage, and it then has an external option to sell
its output at the research stage for a payment M4x5≥ 0,
where M4x5 could be stochastic or deterministic.
The analysis of buyout options contracts closely
follows the literature (Edlin and Hermalin 2000); hence,
we only summarize the results for the efficacy of
buyout contracts. Let 4x1T15= E6U4M4x5+T157, where
4x1T15 denotes the expected revenues to the provider
from option 1. Note that if M4x5 is deterministic, then
4x1T15=U4M4x5+ T15.
Proposition 4 (Edlin andHermalin 2000). (i) Buy-
out options contracts where the client has the option to
choose at time t ∈ 41125 to either give the IP rights to the
provider and a fixed fee T1 (option 1) or retain the IP rights
and pay the provider a fixed fee T2 (option 2) can attain the
first-best solution for the client if and only if there exists
a T1 such that for all x ∈ 601x∗5:
U
(
4V 4x5g4x5+ T15+ 41 −5U−144x1T155
)− x
≤U (4V 4x∗5g4x∗5+ T15+ 41 −5U−144x∗1T155)− x∗
= 00
(ii) The above condition is always satisfied if = 1 (the
provider has all the bargaining power in renegotiation)
and U4V 4x5g4x5+ T15− x is ideally quasiconcave4 in x.
If < 1, then a necessary condition for the first-best solu-
tion to be attained is given by 4dU−144x1T155/dx5x∗ ≥
4dV 4x5g4x5/dx5x∗ = 1/4U ′4U−14x∗555.
As before, V 4x5 is the optimal value of the outcome
after the research stage, if the outcome of the research
stage is successful. The second condition in Propo-
sition 4 yields a condition identical to Proposition 4
(condition 4) in Edlin and Hermalin (2000),5 which
states that the marginal profit for the provider of invest-
ing x∗ from its outside option is weakly greater than
the marginal profit for the centralized system (when
provider and client act as one firm).
Hence, for buyout options contracts to attain the
first-best solution when the bargaining power in rene-
gotiation is shared between the parties, the marginal
profit from the external option has to be sufficiently
high. The only case where buyout options contracts
always attain the first-best solution is the case where
all the bargaining power in the partnership is with
the provider (= 1), which implies that the holdup
problem does not exist (Edlin and Hermalin 2000).
We now compare the efficacy of milestone-based
options contracts and buyout options contracts in
attaining the first-best solution for the client. When
the provider has all the bargaining power in rene-
gotiation (= 1), both contracts attain the first-best
solution (from Propositions 2 and 4).6 When 0<< 1,
4 Edlin and Hermalin (2000) provide the definition of ideally quasi-
concave in their Definition 1 (p. 407).
5 Note that there is an added term of g4x5 in this expression; all other
terms in the necessary condition are the same.
6 Note that milestone-based options contracts attain the first-best
outcome more generally because we do not need to impose any
other conditions. such as ideal quasiconcavity.
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milestone-based options contracts always attain the
first-best solution (from Proposition 2), whereas buyout
options contracts can only attain the first-best solution
if the second condition in Proposition 4 (the marginal
profit from the external option of the provider is high)
is satisfied. The driver of this result is that unlike buy-
out options contracts, milestone-based options contracts
can leverage R&D process levers, like the intermediate
regulatory approval, that increase the efficacy of such
contracts. We now compare explicitly the efficacy of
milestone-based options contracts and buyout options
contracts when = 0 in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. If = 0, then milestone-based options
contracts may attain the first-best solution when buyout
options contracts cannot do so, and buyout options contracts
may attain the first-best solution when milestone-based
options contracts cannot do so.
Interestingly, it is not possible for milestone-based
options contracts to always dominate buyout options
contracts. When = 0, the necessary and sufficient
conditions for buyout options contracts and milestone-
based options contracts are different. The intuition
behind Proposition 5 is as follows. When = 0, the
milestone-based options contract relies on the initial
contract only to attain the first-best outcome because
the provider does not obtain any additional gains
from renegotiation. Although the milestone payment
in the initial contract can be modified, the shape of
the utility function and the probability of a successful
outcome determine if the first-best outcome can be
attained. If the shape of the utility function and the
probability of a successful outcome do not satisfy two
conditions that are necessary for the attainment of the
first-best outcome (see Proposition 3), then no initial
milestone-based option contract can attain the first-best
solution. The intuition behind these two conditions is
that the range of the provider’s utility function has
to be higher than a threshold value to induce it to
make its first-best investment (x∗). In contrast, buyout
options contracts rely on the marginal value of the
outside option, which has to be sufficiently high. Hence,
whereas the milestone-based options contract relies on
the shape of the utility function of the provider (U )
and the shape of the probability of successful outcome
function g4x5, buyout options contracts rely on the
marginal profit of the provider from the outside option
and the shape of V 4x5g4x5. Hence, when = 0, each
contract can attain the first-best solution in a set of
conditions that do not influence the efficacy of the
other contract.
To conclude, we show that the milestone-based
options contract gives the client a greater ability to
attain the first-best outcome when the provider has
some bargaining power during renegotiation. How-
ever, when all the bargaining power is with the client,
managers have to contextually evaluate the two types
of options contracts to infer which contract type per-
forms better than the other. Our results, along with
results from Edlin and Hermalin (2000), provide man-
agers with guidelines in designing R&D outsourcing
contracts.
4.2. Implementation of Milestone-Based
Options Contracts
In this section, we discuss the practical implementation
of the proposed milestone-based options contracts.
First, we note that the fixed fee in the first option for
the options contracts (TA in the milestone-based options
contract) may be negative. Note that this is true for
buyout options contracts as well because T1 in the
buyout options contract may be negative. An important
element of the negative fixed fee is as follows: owing
to the mechanics of the options contract, the fixed fee
is necessary for the efficacy of the options contract.
Although milestone-based options contracts can attain
the first-best solution by providing a positive milestone
payment, attaining the first-best solution dictates that
the client have a negative fixed fee to extract the surplus
from the provider to make its participation constraint
tight. (The fixed fee TA is linked to TMg4x5, and hence
its magnitude is significantly lower than TM .)7
Second, the results presented in §4.1 assume that
the milestone payment (TM ) and the fixed fee (TA) are
unrestricted. For the milestone-based options contract
to attain the first-best outcome, an implicit requirement
is that option A of the milestone-based options contract
can be enforced, if exercised. This assumption is key to
the attainment of the first-best solution. In practice, the
ability of the client to pay a high milestone payment
and that of the provider to pay a high fixed fee to
the client may be limited by their respective net asset
values (cash, physical, and IP; see Holmstrom 1982).
In such a case, there may be exogenous bounds that
need to be enforced on the contractual parameters: an
upper bound on the milestone payment and a lower
(negative) bound on the fixed fee. When  ∈ 40117, we
show that there exists a finite TM and TA that ensure
that the first-best solution is always attained.
We note that the values of TM and TA (negative) may
be high, which may impede the practical implementa-
tion of the proposed milestone-based options contracts.
It follows from the proof of Proposition 2 that the
first-best outcome is attainable by setting TM and TA
such that T¯M ≤ TM < and −<U−14x∗5− TMg4x∗5≤
TA ≤ U−14x∗5− TMg4x∗5, where T¯M (<) has been
defined in the proof of Proposition 2. The value of
TM = 1/4U ′4U−14x∗55g′4x∗55 < ensures that the first-
best solution can be attained with finite values of the
7 If the provider has a positive reservation value, then the magnitude
of the negative fixed fee is smaller for both kinds of options contracts
and may also be positive depending on the reservation value.
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milestone payment and the fixed fee. Note that the
above inequalities provide conservative bounds because
they satisfy sufficient conditions for the attainment
of the first-best outcome. This implies that if TM is
exogenously restricted to be lower than T¯M and TA is
restricted to be higher than U−14x∗5− T¯Mg4x∗5, then
the sufficient conditions (Proposition 2) to attain the
first-best solution are not satisfied. Therefore, in such
cases, the implementation of the proposed milestone-
based options contracts may be unrealistic in the
motivating context. When = 0, attainment of the first-
best solution requires that U−14x∗ + 41 − g4x∗55/g′4x∗55
and U−14x∗ −g4x∗5/g′4x∗55 should exist and be finite,
and by setting TA ≤U−14x∗ − g4x∗5/g′4x∗55 and TM ≥
U−14x∗ + 41−g4x∗55/g′4x∗55−TA. Finally, for all  ∈ 60117
TB is always set equal to U−14x∗5. Note that U−14x∗5 is
the minimum transfer payment needed to satisfy the
provider’s participation constraint.
With respect to the magnitude of the milestone pay-
ment, note that there are other mitigating factors to
moderate the magnitude of the milestone payment.
If royalty payments are used along with the mile-
stone payments, then the magnitude of the milestone
payment to achieve the first-best outcome is lower.
We have not included this factor in the paper since
its focus is on the role of milestone payments as the
driving force behind the achievement of the first-best
outcome. In addition, the magnitude of the negative
fixed fee (TA) can be lower if the reservation value of
the provider is positive. We chose not to model the
positive reservation value in the paper because it has
no role to play in the game apart from providing a
higher normalizing value for the provider.
5. Conclusions and Discussion
In this paper, we study the efficacy of milestone-based
options contracts and buyout options contracts in
coordinating the client’s and provider’s investments
in an R&D partnership. We assume that the risk-
averse provider is the first mover that invests in the
research stage, and a risk-neutral client invests in the
development stage if the research stage is successful.
The outcome of the research stage is verifiable to all
parties. We model the problem as a sequential bilateral
investment problem using a principal–agent framework
with double-sided moral hazard, with the client as the
principal.
Our results can be summarized as follows. When
milestone-based options contracts are used, interest-
ingly, the client can always attain the first-best solution
if the provider has some bargaining power in rene-
gotiation. If the provider has no bargaining power
in renegotiation, the client can attain the first-best
outcome if some conditions are met, and we character-
ize those conditions. In this case, we show that the
client can only attain the first-best solution when the
utility of the provider has a range that incorporates
two threshold values.
In contrast, as the literature has shown, if buyout
options contracts are used, the first-best outcome can
be achieved unconditionally by the client only if all the
bargaining power in renegotiation is with the provider.
If the bargaining power is shared between the client
and the provider, then a necessary condition for buyout
options contracts to attain the first-best solution is that
the marginal value of the external option has to be
high. Hence, we show that milestone-based options
contracts Pareto dominate buyout options contracts if
the provider has some bargaining power in renegoti-
ation. The driver of this result is that unlike buyout
options contracts, milestone-based options contracts
can leverage R&D process levers, like the intermediate
regulatory approval, that increases the efficacy of such
contracts. When the provider has no bargaining power
in renegotiation, then both milestone-based options
contracts and buyout options contracts may attain
the first-best solution in restricted domains, and we
characterize those domains.
We illustrated the questions being addressed in the
paper with an example of a drug for the treatment of
ADHD being codeveloped between Supernus Pharma-
ceuticals and Shire plc. Note the following: (i) If royalty
payments are part of option A in the milestone-based
options contract as in the illustrative example, then the
milestone payment and the corresponding fixed fee
offered by the client for the first-best outcome to be
attained are lower than those described in the paper,
and we did not include royalty payments to make the
model parsimonious. (ii) The renegotiation between the
parties was conducted in May 2009, before Shire plc
obtained FDA approval in September 2009. This is an
important condition for both the milestone-payment-
based options contract and buyout options contract
to attain the first-best solution; it is easy to see that
they cannot attain the first-best solution with an exer-
cise time t > 2 (after the outcome of the intermediate
verifiable signal) because the provider has to be paid
a risk premium. (iii) Supernus accepted a fixed fee
of $36.9 million in renegotiation rather than the risky
milestone payments and royalties. The milestone-based
options contract presented in this paper can replicate
the mechanism (and outcome) of the illustrated rene-
gotiation by setting the fixed fee of option B equal
to the fixed transfer payment that is expected from
the renegotiation. Finally, it is easy to see that in the
options-based contracts, the options have to be exer-
cised by the client as the second mover, and if the
provider has the right to exercise the option, then the
client is exposed to the moral hazard problem because
the provider can choose to invest zero and then pay
itself with the fixed-fee contract.
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We have also conducted robustness checks on the
probability of successful outcome (g4x5) being a noisy
measure and the provider being risk neutral. In the first
case (noisy probability of a successful outcome), we
find that the options contracts have the same domain of
attaining the first-best outcome (by taking the expected
value of the probability of the successful outcome
conditional on the investment x). If the provider is
risk neutral, we find that the options contracts in the
paper always attain the first-best solution; in addition,
a simple milestone payment with fixed-fee contract can
also attain the first-best outcome.
We also outline a number of interesting avenues
for future research. Note that our results rely on the
assumption that the investments are fully observable.
It would be interesting to analyze the performance of
the contracts studied here when the investments are
only partially observable. It would also be interesting
to compare the efficacy of milestone-based options
contracts and buyout options contracts when both
contract types fail to attain the first-best outcome
(when = 0). In this case, managers are faced with
designing optimal (second-best) contracts and it is
unclear which of these contract types would dominate.
Another area of potential future research is to study
settings that incorporate more process details such
as multiple steps in the research phase with multiple
regulatory approval stages. Such settings will closely
capture the pharmaceutical industry; however, they
will involve a more tedious comparison with buyout
options contracts.
Finally, the implementation of the contracts studied
in this paper is widely observed in R&D partnerships.
Buyout options contracts are observed in practice, sug-
gesting that options-based contracts are considered
viable in such partnerships. Although we have not seen
milestone-based options contracts in practice, milestone
payments and fixed fees are widely prevalent (Cornelli
and Yosha 2003, Robinson and Stuart 2007). Putting the
two together, we posit that creating options contracts
that are based on milestone payments does not pose
any additional challenges to client firms. Moreover, as
discussed above in the Intuniv illustrative example,
initial contracts linked to stochastic payments are often
renegotiated to fixed payments in practice. The options
contracts studied in this paper have an added advan-
tage that there is no renegotiation in equilibrium under
such contracts. In addition, our results suggest that
options based on milestone payments and fixed fees
are capable of eliminating the agency issues in R&D
outsourcing.
To summarize, the high complexity of the R&D
process due to large monetary investments and high
uncertainty in outcomes is leading to a growth in R&D
partnerships. In this context, firms are faced with the
challenge of overcoming different agency issues that
may limit the effectiveness of such partnerships. Our
paper provides managerial insights for the existence
of optimal contracts that can overcome potential inef-
ficiencies in R&D partnerships due to the different
agency issues. For example, one might expect that in
a partnership with an inherently uncertain outcome,
the risk aversion of one party would lead to a loss in
efficiency in the system in the form of a risk-premium.
We show that by using characteristics of R&D processes
in practice that are verifiable intermediate signals, such
as FDA approval or EPA certification, options-based
contracts can be designed to eliminate such losses.
Milestones have been recognized in the operations
literature on new product development for their role in
monitoring the product and supply chain development
effort (Joglekar et al. 2001, Graves and Willems 2005);
for risk sharing in new product development (Mihm
2010); and for coordinating unilateral efforts (single-
sided moral hazard) in the R&D supply chain with
asymmetric information on exogenous probability of
successful outcomes (Crama et al. 2008). This paper
demonstrates that milestones are critical in coordi-
nating bilateral investments in R&D partnerships as
they simultaneously overcome relevant agency issues.
Our results provide normative recommendations to
alleviate agency issues in R&D partnerships. Based
on our findings, we propose that partners in the joint
development effort can make better decisions on the
contractual elements used, and the framework pro-
posed in the paper can act as a prescriptive model in
this regard.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Recall that for first-best we need
the following conditions to be true:
Condition 1. The optimal decisions of the provider and the
client are x∗1y∗.
Condition 2. The transfer payment made to the provider by
the client is U−14x∗5 and is not linked to any stochastic outcome.
As mentioned in the body of the paper, the provider will
get G4x5 from the GNB result, which is a property of the
GNB model. To see this, assume that the provider with
bargaining power  gets P , and the client with bargaining
power 1− gets G4x5−P . Then the GNB outcome is given by
max
P≥0
P6G4x5− P71−
⇒ P−16G4x5− P71− − 41 −5P6G4x5− P7− = 0
⇒ P = G4x50
Therefore, from (4), the provider’s problem is
max
x≥0
min
{
U−14U¯ 4x55+G4x5− x1TB − x
}
0
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If the provider invests x∗, then the client’s problem is
max
y≥0
{
E6  x∗1y7− y}0 (11)
Comparing (11) and (1) confirms that the client makes the
first-best investment y∗. Therefore, we need to derive condi-
tions such that the provider invests x∗ and that Condition 2 is
satisfied. Our claim is that to attain the first-best outcome we
need to show that there exists a TM 1 TA, such that ∀x ∈ 601 x∗5,
the following holds:
U
[
4TMg4x5+ TA5+ 41 −5U−14U¯ 4x55
]− x
≤U [4TMg4x∗5+ TA5+ 41 −5U−14U¯ 4x∗55]− x∗ = 00 (12)
To show sufficiency, let us assume that (12) is satisfied for
some TM and TA. Set TB such that
U4TB5− x∗ = 00 (13)
Equations (12) and (13) ensure that the provider will not
invest x 6= x∗. Assume that the provider invests x < x∗. In this
case the provider’s utility is
min
{
U4U−14U¯ 4x55+G4x55− x1U4TB5− x
}
=U4U−14U¯ 4x55+G4x55− x≤ 0 (from (12))0
Assume that the provider invests x > x∗. In this case the
provider’s utility is
min
{
U4U−14U¯ 4x55+G4x55− x1U4TB5− x
}
≤U4TB5− x < 0 (from (13))0
Hence, the provider will invest x= x∗ because deviating is
not beneficial.
Next we will show that (12) is also necessary for the
attainment of the first-best outcome. Let us assume that
there exists a 8TM1TA1TB9= 8M1 A1 B9 such that the first-
best outcome is attained and there exists a x˜ ∈ 601x∗5
such that U4U−14U¯ 4x˜55 + G4x˜55 − x˜ > U4U−14U¯ 4x∗55 +
G4x∗55− x∗. Since first-best is assumed to exist, from Con-
dition 2 we have that min8U4U−14U¯ 4x∗55+ G4x∗55− x∗1
U4B5− x∗9= 0. This implies that U4U−14U¯ 4x∗55+G4x∗55−
x∗ ≥ 0 and U4B5− x∗ ≥ 0. Since U4U−14U¯ 4x˜55+ G4x˜55−
x˜ > U4U−14U¯ 4x∗55 + G4x∗55 − x∗ and x˜ < x∗, if the
provider invests x˜ < x∗, its utility is min8U4U−14U¯ 4x˜55+
G4x˜55− x˜1U4B5− x˜9 >min8U4U−14U¯ 4x∗55+G4x∗55−x∗1
U4B5 − x∗9 = 0; hence, the client cannot attain the first-
best outcome. Finally, let us assume that there exists a
8TM1TA1TB9= 8˜M1 ˜A1 ˜B9 such that the first-best outcome
is attained and U4U−14U¯ 4x55+G4x55− x≤U4U−14U¯ 4x∗55+
G4x∗55 − x∗ ∀x ∈ 601x∗5. We need to show that it must
be that U4U−14U¯ 4x∗55 + G4x∗55 − x∗ = 0. Clearly it can-
not be the case that U4U−14U¯ 4x∗55 + G4x∗55 − x∗ < 0,
because then min8U 4U−14U¯ 4x∗55+G4x∗55−x∗1U 4TB5−x∗9<0,
which violates the participation constraint of the provider.
If U4U−14U¯ 4x∗55+G4x∗55−x∗ > 0, then there exists a  → 0+
such that U4U−14U¯ 4x∗ −55+G4x∗ −55−4x∗ −5>0 because
of the continuity of the function h4x5 = U4U−14U¯ 4x55 +
G4x55− x. Since first-best is assumed to exist, from Con-
dition 2 we have that min8U4U−14U¯ 4x∗55+ G4x∗55− x∗1
U4˜B5 − x∗9 = 0. This implies that U4˜B5 − x∗ ≥ 0. Since
U4U−14U¯ 4x∗ − 55+G4x∗ − 55−4x∗ − 5 > 0 and x˜ < x∗, if the
provider invests x∗ − , its utility is min8U 4U−14U¯ 4x∗ − 55+
G4x∗ − 55− 4x∗ − 5 > 01U4˜B5−x∗ + 9 >min801U4˜B5−x∗9
= 0; hence the client cannot attain the first-best outcome as
the Condition 2 is violated. Therefore, (12) gives the necessary
and sufficient condition for the attainment of the first-best
outcome. Substituting G4x5 in (12) yields the necessary and
sufficient condition stated in the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) When = 1, (9) reduces to
∃TM1TA s.t.
dU4TMg4x5+TA5
dx
−1≥01 ∀x∈ 601x∗71 (14)
and (10) is satisfied by setting TA =U−14x∗5− TMg4x∗5. Since
U4 · 5 and g4 · 5 are strictly increasing and concave, (14) is
satisfied if U ′4U−14x∗55TMg′4x∗5≥ 1. This is always satisfied
by setting TM = 1/4U ′4U−14x∗55g′4x∗55.
(ii) When 0 < < 1, from Jensen’s inequality, we have
that U¯ 4x5≤U4TMg4x5+TA5. For TM ≥ 0, U4TM +TA5g4x5+
U4TA541 −g4x55≥U4TA5 since U4 · 5 is increasing. Therefore,
we have TA ≤U−14U¯ 4x55≤ TMg4x5+ TA. Substituting this in
(10) yields
U−14x∗5− TMg4x∗5≤ TA ≤U−14x∗5− TMg4x∗50
Therefore, given a finite TM ≥ 0, there exists a finite TA that
ensures that (10) is satisfied. The inequality in condition (9)
can be expanded as
U ′4T˜A5
[
TMg
′4x5+ 41 −5 d
dx
U−14U¯ 4x55
]
≥ 11
∀x ∈ 601x∗70 (15)
This expression can be further expanded as
U ′4T˜A5
[
TMg
′4x5+ 41 −5g
′4x56U4TM + TA5−U4TA57
U ′4U−14U¯ 4x555
]
≥ 11
∀x ∈ 601x∗70
Note that because U4 · 5 is concave and increasing, we have
U ′4T˜A5 ≥ U ′4U−14x∗55 > 0. Also, since TM >01U4TM + TA5
>U4TA5, and by assumption, g′4x5 > 0 ∀x ∈ 6015 and
g4 · 5 is concave. Therefore, it is easy to see that there
exists a finite TM = T¯M such that T¯M + 41 − 5å4T¯M 5 =
1/4U ′4U−14x∗55g′4x∗55, where å4T¯M 5 = 6U4T¯M + U−14x∗55
− x∗7/4U ′4U−14x∗5− T¯Mg4x∗555 > 0, and this satisfies the suf-
ficient conditions. Note that setting TM such that TM =
1/4U ′4U−14x∗55g′4x∗55 is also a (conservative) sufficient
condition to show that (15) can be satisfied. 
Proof of Proposition 3. When = 0, from Proposition 1,
the necessary and sufficient conditions for attaining the
first-best solution are given by
U¯ 4x5− x≤ 0 ∀x ∈ 601x∗51 (16)
U¯ 4x∗5= x∗0 (17)
From Equation (17), we have
U4TM + TA5=
x∗
g4x∗5
−U4TA5
(
1
g4x∗5
− 1
)
0 (18)
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Since g4 · 5 is an increasing and concave function, Equation (16)
can then be rewritten as
d
dx
U¯ 4x5≥1 ⇒ U4TM +TA5−U4TA5≥
1
g′4x∗5
∀x≤x∗0 (19)
Substituting the terms for U4TM +TA5 and U4TA5 from (18)
in (19), TH = TM +TA, and TA = TL gives us the desired bounds
for the utility values. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The utilities of the provider
from a buyout options contract are given by
U 1P 4x5= 4x1T15− x1
U 2P 4x5=U4T25− x0
As before, let V 4x5 be the optimal value of the outcome
after the research stage, if the outcome of the research stage is
successful. That is, V 4x5= maxy≥0 E6  x1y7−y. Similar to the
case in §4.1, a potential holdup may take place in this case
if the client does not exercise option 2—which exposes the
risk-averse provider to a stochastic reward from the outside
option, in which case both the provider and the client are
mutually better off by renegotiating option 1 to a fixed-fee
contract T˜1. The total surplus of such a renegotiation is
G4x5 = 6V 4x5g4x5− x7− 6U−144x1T155− T1 − x7
= V 4x5g4x5+ T1 −U−144x1T1550
Similar to Edlin and Hermalin (2000), we assume that the
R&D partnership is valuable or V 4x5g4x5≥U−144x1T155−T1.
Therefore, G4x5≥ 0. Similar to Proposition 1, if the client does
not exercise option 2, then option 1 will be renegotiated to a
fixed-fee contract (T˜1) such that T˜1 =U−144x1T155+G4x5,
where the client buys back the IP of the research stage from
the provider by paying it T˜1. Therefore, because of the holdup
problem, which may lead to potential renegotiation, the
provider solves the following problem:
max
x≥0
min
{
U4U−144x1T155+G4x55− x1U4T25− x
}
0 (20)
The client’s problem can be stated as follows:
max
T11T2
{[
E6  x˜1y˜4x˜57− y˜4x˜5]g4x˜5
−min{U−144x˜1T155+G4x˜51T2}} (21)
s.t. y˜4x5=argmax
y≥0
6E6 x1y7−y7g4x5
−min{U−144x1T155+G4x51T2}1 (22)
x˜=argmax
x≥0
min
{
U4U−144x1T155+G4x55−x1
U4T25−x
}
1 (23)
min
{
U4U−144x˜1T155+G4x˜55− x˜1U 4T25− x˜
}≥00 (24)
If the provider invests x∗, then the client’s problem is
max
y≥0
{
E6  x∗1y7− y}0 (25)
Comparing (25) and (1) confirms that the client makes the
first-best investment y∗. Therefore, we need to derive condi-
tions such that the provider invests x∗ and that Condition 2
(above) is satisfied. Our claim is that to attain the first-best
outcome we need to show that for a given M4x5, the following
condition is necessary and sufficient:
∃T1 s.t. U
(
U−144x1T155+G4x5
)−x
≤U (U−144x∗1T155+G4x∗5)−x∗ =01
∀x∈ 601x∗50 (26)
To show sufficiency, let us assume that (26) is satisfied for
some T1. Set T2 such that
U4T25− x∗ = 00 (27)
Equations (26) and (27) ensure that the provider will not
invest x 6= x∗. Assume that the provider invests x < x∗. In this
case the provider’s utility is
min
{
U4U−144x1T155+G4x55− x1U4T25− x
}
=U4U−144x1T155+G4x55− x≤ 0 (from (26)).
Assume that the provider invests x > x∗. In this case the
provider’s utility is
min
{
U4U−144x1T155+G4x55− x1U4T25− x
}
≤U4T25− x < 0 (from (27))0
Hence, the provider will invest x= x∗ because deviating is
not beneficial.
Next we will show that (26) is also necessary for the
attainment of the first-best outcome. Let us assume that
there exists a 8T11T29= 811 29 such that the first-best out-
come is attained and there exists a x˜ ∈ 601x∗5 such that
U4U−144x˜1 155+G4x˜55− x˜ > U4U−144x∗1 155+G4x∗55−
x∗. Since first-best is assumed to exist, we have that
min8U4U−144x∗1 155+G4x∗55−x∗1 U425− x∗9= 0. This
implies that U4U−144x1 155+G4x∗55−x∗ ≥ 0 and U425−x∗ ≥
0. Since U4U−144x˜1 155+G4x˜55− x˜ > U4U−144x∗1 155+
G4x∗55 − x∗ and x˜ < x∗, if the provider invests x˜ < x∗,
its utility is min8U4U−144x˜1 155+G4x˜55− x˜1U425− x˜9 >
min8U4U−144x∗1 155+G4x∗55−x∗, U425− x∗9= 0; hence
the client cannot attain the first-best outcome. Finally, Let us
assume that there exists a 8T11 T29= 8˜11 ˜29 such that the first-
best outcome is attained and U4U−144x1 ˜155+G4x55− x≤
U4U−144x∗1 ˜155+G4x∗55−x∗ ∀x ∈ 601 x∗5. We need to show
that it must be that U4U−144x∗1 ˜155+G4x∗55−x∗ = 0. Clearly
it cannot be the case that U4U−144x∗1 ˜155+G4x∗55− x∗ < 0
because then min8U4U−144x∗1 ˜155+G4x∗55−x∗1U4˜25−
x∗9 < 0, which violates the participation constraint of the
provider. If U4U−144x∗1 ˜155+G4x∗55−x∗ > 0, then there
exists a  → 0+ such that U4U−144x∗ − 1 ˜155+G4x∗ − 55−
4x∗ − 5 > 0 because of the continuity of the function h4x5=
U4U−144x1 ˜155+G4x55−x. Since first-best is assumed to
exist, from Condition 2 we have that min8U 4U−144x∗1 ˜155+
G4x∗55− x∗1U4˜25− x∗9= 0. This implies that U4˜25− x∗ ≥
0. Since U4U−144x∗ − 1 ˜155+ G4x∗ − 55− 4x∗ − 5 > 0
and x˜ < x∗, if the provider invests x∗ − , its utility is
min8U 4U−144x∗ − 1 ˜155+G4x∗ − 55− 4x∗ − 51U 4˜25−x∗ +
9 > min801U4˜25− x∗9= 0; hence the client cannot attain
the first-best outcome. Therefore, (26) gives the necessary
and sufficient condition for the attainment of the first-best
outcome. Substituting G4x5 in (26) yields the necessary and
sufficient condition stated in the proposition.
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When = 1, (26) reduces to
∃T1 s.t. U4V 4x5g4x5+ T15− x
≤U4V 4x∗5g4x∗5+ T15− x∗ = 0
∀x ∈ 601x∗50 (28)
Set T1 = U−14x∗5 − V 4x∗5g4x∗5. Taking the derivative of
U4V 4x5g4x5+ T15− x at x∗ yields
U ′4U−14x∗55
dV 4x5g4x55
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=x∗
− 10
From (2) it follows that the derivative of U4V 4x5g4x5+T15−x
is zero at x∗. Therefore, condition (28) follows from the ideally
quasiconcavity of U4V 4x5g4x5+ T15− x.
When < 1, for (26) to be satisfied, it is necessary that
the slope of U4U−144x1T155+G4x55−x be positive at x∗.
Therefore, the necessary condition for (26) to hold is
dU4U−144x1T155+G4x55
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=x∗
≥ 10 (29)
Simplifying (29) yields
U ′4U−14x∗55
(

dV 4x5g4x5
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=x∗
+41 −5dU
−144x1T155
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=x∗
)
≥ 10 (30)
Using (2), (30) simplifies further as
dU−144x1T155
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=x∗
≥ 1
U ′4U−14x∗55
=dV 4x5g4x5
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=x∗
0  (31)
Proof of Proposition 5. From Proposition 3, milestone-
based options contracts do not attain the first-best solution
when = 0, and the two conditions in Proposition 3 are not
satisfied ((32) and (33)).
∃ T˜11 T˜2 s.t.
U4T˜15 ≥ x∗ +
1 − g4x∗5
g′4x∗5
1 (32)
U4T˜25 ≤ x∗ −
g4x∗5
g′4x∗5
0 (33)
Therefore, when = 0, (32) and (33) are not satisfied, and
there exists a T1 such that 84x∗1T15= x∗1d4x1T15/dx ≥ 1
∀x ∈ 601x∗59, then milestone-based options contracts do
not attain the first-best outcome, whereas buyout options
contracts do. Similarly, when = 0, (32) and (33) are satisfied,
and there does not exist a T1 such that 4d4x1T15/dx5x=x∗ ≥ 1,
then milestone-based options contracts attain the first-best
outcome, whereas buyout options contracts do not do so. 
Functions and Parameters Values for Numerical Example. We
assume the following functional forms for all the numerical
examples presented in the paper:
g4x5= 1 − e−x1 f 41x1y5= 4x1y5e−4x1y51
1/4x1y5=xy1 U4z5= 41 − ez50
The parameter values assumed are  = 9 × 10−4,  = 007,
= 500, = 500 × 10−8,  = 4 × 10−8, and = 107 . With these
functions and parameters, we have x∗ = 5023 × 106, y∗ =
3016 × 108, g4x∗5= 0023, and E67=4x∗54y∗5 = 4052 × 108.
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